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Introduction 
On each side of the political spectrum today we see a fear of social 
disintegration and a call for a revival of community. (Giddens, 1994a: 124) 
In an age where people have more opportunity to be intercormected 
across space and time through technologically aided communication 
than during any other period in history, the (post)modern individual in 
contemporary Western society is paradoxically feeling increasingly 
isolated. New ways to understand and experience meaningful 
togetherness are being sought1 Nostalgia underpins some of this 
impetus. Re-presented memories of 1950s-style communities where 
moral, social, and public order flourished are contrasted with the 
depiction of present social forms as chaotic, morally impoverished, and 
narcissistic. However, there is also, theoretically at least, the desire to 
formulate more enriching ways of experiencing ourselves in relation, 
which escape the dangers of earlier, restrictive forms of community. 
The current (both theoretical and practical) interest in community can 
thus be seen as a search for a more inclusive, enriching way of life and 
as a reaction to the impersonal, alienating, and individuating effects of 
(post)modernity. 
Community is one of those amorphous concepts that is easily and 
loosely employed while rarely defined or explained c1early.2 It is 
commonly used to refer to a grouping of people with various attributes 
while also inferring that it is or contains something that is emotionally 
enriching and valuable. Despite the plethora of different 
understandings, it seems to me that the essence or fundamental 
component of any conception of community (recognizing the problems 
with many of these loaded terms) is an understanding of community 
as ways of being-together. Community has had a bad reputation; it has 
been understood as being repressive and conformist. However, it has 
also been associated with a valued sense of connection and belonging. 
L Technically Together 
The dilemma faced by cantemparary community theorists is how to 
formulate an ethically appropriate theory of cammunity that avo. ids 
the excludmg and confarming practices of the past, yet is able to 
recogmze the ontologically important aspects of being-together. This 
dilemma entails balancing concerns for the freedom or autonomy of 
the mdlvldual and concern for social integration; ar what I refer to rather 
awkwardly in this baak as the differentiating/integrative dilemma. 
Wlthm Western techno-society, innovations in communication 
technologies create passibilities for new forms of sociality. 
Technologically mediated social practices have received a lat of attention 
among scholars and public alike, in terms af the communal paSSibilitie~ 
and constramts they affard. For example, virtual cammunities-or 
cammunities experienced through technological mediation over the 
Internet - are presented by some cam menta tors as a form of postmadern 
cammunity and as the answer to. the search for a less exclusive Or 
repressive experience of community. Writers such as Howard Rheingold 
and Mark Poster suggest that teclmological cammunities could provide 
the s~lutlOn to the differentiating/integrative dilemma that community 
theonsts are seekmg. LikeWise, writers such as Manuel Castells Or Barry 
;;Vellman pomt to the"advantages of mediated sociality for the 
networked mdl.vldual. While technaloglcal praCtices certainly offer 
s?Clal opportumtles, I am uneasy about turning to the proclaimed 
liberatory and mterconnective potential of these new relational forms 
for a visian of future ways of being-together. I am also uneasy about 
uncnh~ally valonzmg the so-called networked society. In view of 
society s reliance on technology to solve its problems, some skepticism 
toward and further examination of the claims surrounding 
technolaglcally mediated SOCial farms IS required. For it seems plausible 
that thiS hunger for community evident in (post)modernity is in fact 
partly dnven by the expenence and implicatians of being an individual 
wlthm a technologically organized and aided society.3 
Broad recogmtlOn of the importance of considering interrelational 
Or intersubjective activity is taking place.' The postmodern emphasis 
On the micro has too. often meant that the focus has been placed solely 
an the mdlvldual, subject, Or self. Relatians with others (though concern 
over these relatIOns IS aften the proclaimed rationale behind many 
postmodern approaches) have been either neglected or pasited as a 
saurce or site af oppression. More recent work on community and 
networked relations could be seen as an attempt to redress this 
Imbalance. Yet there is also recognition among community thearists of 
mast onentatlOns that a return to a traditional style of community is 
neIther oosslblp nor oP<;;lr.1hlp Hpnrp ~hp <::llhl-itlp At I-h-ic "hrv ... 1r. DoJ.l-.;-Hl,-;~r. 
Introauctwn 
Community within Techno-Society. In this context, techno-saciety is being 
used as a shorthand term to refer to. (predominantly Western) societies 
where the dominant modes af interaction and integration are 
increasingly technologically mediated. The title, Technically Together, is 
therefore part description and part question. It refers to the increasing 
ways in which being-together is technologically mediated, and it also 
questians the form, degree, and experience of this type of togetherness. 
This book attempts a number of things. Its central premise is that 
the increasingly daminant practices of technolagical mediation and 
extension of social relations mean that we need to rethink our 
understandings and practices of community. Using communications 
technologies extends the capacity to connect with peaple through space 
and time, therefore enabling the continuation and extension of relations 
af community. Interpersonal interconnectivity is consequently 
heightened far both the individual and the community. Yet changing 
experiences af time, space, and the body, as a result af technological 
pOSSibilities, impact on aur ways of being-tagether altering individual 
subjectivity and intersubjective relations. These changing sacial relations 
require conceptualizing and discussing accarding to their positioning 
within and across various forms of cammunity. 
However, I also want to explore a number of contemporary writings 
on community to determine their understanding(s) af community and 
if and how they address technologically mediated social practices. The 
secand half of the boak is devoted to this task. 
Throughout, questions are asked about the sacial and ethical 
ramifications of mediated social practices and the ways in which we 
understand these. Before progressing with these investigations, 
however, some background information and definitional concerns need 
to be addressed. Far example, what is meant by virtual communities? If I 
argue that technologically extended sacial relatians have ramifications 
for subjectivity and thus for community farms, then how is subjectivity 
to. be understoad? What do I mean when I refer to ontological categories, 
and to the ways in which different experiences af time, space, and 
embodiment are important to aur ways afbeing-together? These issues 
are autlined briefly below. 
Virtual Communities 
At the very moment that there is talk about the loss of "real" community, 
many theorists, researchers, and practitioners-groups who don't typically 
"speak" to one another-all appear to share a common interest in the 
community enabled by the Internet. (Renninger & Shumar, 2002: 1) 
In 1993 Howard Rheingold published a now-famous book entitled The 
Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. In it, he wrote 
of the liberating and inclusive potential of (virtual) communities realized 
through computer-networked interaction.' When linked to 
telecommunications networks, computer systems allow people to 
communicate with one another locally, nationally, and globally. Within 
these various networking systems, both community interaction and 
access to information can take place. 
Virtual community is a term commonly used to describe 
communities that exist within bulletin boards, conference groups, 
MUDs, MOOs, and other interactive communication systems.' 
Increasingly, newer phenomena like MMOGs (massively multiple online 
games) and weblogs also fall within this category. Interaction is (still) 
predominantly textual, conducted through a keyboard. This is changing 
over time with the increasing sophistication of virtual reality 
technologies, the continual enhancement of graphic and video 
technologies, and the widening applications of digital technologies. 
However, while visual information remains largely limited to text-based 
description, and audile or other sensorial information is excluded from 
the interaction, the player or community member is able to depict her/ 
himself in whatever shape, form, or gender s/he desires. The participants 
in any of these virtual communities interact, discuss problems, and offer 
support to those who are suffering personal crises and yet usually cannot 
see or touch the individuals with whom they interact; there is no physical 
person-to-person contact. 
In 1993 Rheingold generally saw the future potential of these virtual 
communities optimistically, as a way in which democracy could be 
enhanced through increased citizen participation in the decision-making 
processes of government.' He likened interaction via the computer 
monitor to the re-creating of a public space where vigorous social 
discourse can take place. Within this public space, all who have access 
to the technological resources can participate. Rheingold argued that 
the interactions that take place through computers are equalizing 
(Rheingold, 1993: 62-63) in the sense that social and professional 
positions are invisible and do not enable the possessors of these 
privileges in the real world any such privileges or rights within the 
virtual community itself. Such communities, he argued, enable people 
to interact unencumbered by the prejudices they may experience in face-
to-face encounters due to their embodied identities. Issues of race, age, 
gender, or disability are left behind, enabling freer, more equitable 
communities to develop. And while his later writings are more critically 
aware of the less utopian possibilities of virtual commumty engagement, 
his belief in these claims seems to still hold. 8 .. 
Rheingold's portrayal of technological com mum tIes (and more 
recently of "smart mobs") creates the impression of new, possIbly 
postmodern, modes of human interaction and of socIal forms. Mark 
Poster would seem to agree. Indeed, in 1995 Poster argued that we ~:re 
entering what may end up being a new age: "the second medIa age as 
he referred to it. This new age, he suggested, may have fundamental 
implications for a participant's subjectivity and her/his expenences .of 
identity. The emergence of this new age IS attnbuted to the posslbJlltJes 
enabled by new interactive commumcahon technologIes. Poster, along 
with many other Internet writers, argues that new mteractJve medw 
enables a level of identity fluidity previously unknown. He. wntes that 
the new technologies are able to enhance social commumcahon and 
community among those multiple fragmented Idenhtles that are 
symptomatic of the postmodern age. Such enha.ncement IS seen as bemg 
transformative in the sense of opening up posslblhhes for new forms of 
community within techno-society.. . 
This perception raises many questIOns. Are tec~nologJcal 
communities the vision of the future or simply a fantasy dnven by the 
desire for a more enriching, interactive lifestyle? Does the technologIcal 
community or the network society provide the answer for a more ennchmg 
social form that avoids the negative consequences of ear.her forms of 
community? Or are these writings simply the hI-tech eqUIvalent of the 
efforts of other community theorists concerned to strengthen or retneve 
community forms? This book explores these questions-argumg that 
both technological and nontechnological community theonsts are 
attempting to negotiate a balance between the accommodatIOn .of 
difference and togetherness. It also argues that both types of commumty 
theory fail to adequately consider the ImphcatlOns of the use of 
technology for understandings and expenences of commumty. 
Community and Technology 
As noted above, there is still much theoretical work to be done on the 
interplay of technology and community. This brings us to the core of 
this book and the problem with contemporary debates on commumty. 
Theorists, I argue, often ignore the issue of technologIcally medIated 
social practices (the first position), or else present technology SImply as 
providing the means to achieve, supplement, or undermme deslfable 
community forms (the second pOSItIOn). 
The first position (non technological) fails to consider that the uses 
of technology to mediate social practices may warrant considered 
attention. This failure has more than immediate consequences. The 
current use of technology-particularly of communication/information 
technology-leads to the accentuation of a focus on the individual and 
to her/his compartmentalization. Indeed, as has already been suggested, 
some of this resurgence in interest into community forms could stem 
from the individuation that has resulted in part from the application of 
such technologies. A better understanding of community forms-and 
the coexistence and interrelationship of these different forms-within 
techno-society is thus crucial. Similarly, the implications of extending 
social relations across time and space through the use of technology 
require analysis. 
The second position (technological) is primarily interested in the 
phenomenal possibilities that communication technology enables. This 
interest differs depending on how theorists understand the socio-
technological relationship and how they understand technology itself. 
The positions can generally be characterized as follows: technology is 
seen variously as (1) a tool enabling the supplementation or destruction 
of existing communities; (2) providing the possibilities for new social 
forms; or (3) destroying/undermining the possibilities for community. 
These positions often fail to sufficiently consider the intersubjective 
implications of abstract social relations enacted through the technology. 
They do not adequately take into account the implications of changes 
in the ways in which ontological categories such as embodiment, time 
and space, and knowledge are experienced and practiced, and how these 
impact on both the forms and structures of community and on individual 
subjectivity. 
Within Internet and new media studies, considerable attention is 
being placed on technologically meditated social forms and practices. 
There is also a growing pool of empirical data on these mediated forms 
to be drawn on. However, it seems to me that there is still much to be 
done in situating this work within a broader theoretical understanding 
of communities and ethical social relations and that there is valuable 
work being undertaken outside of these studies that could provide 
critical insight. 
S u bj ecti vity 
Any discussion of technology and community requires consideration 
of issues of subjectivity. What is meant by the term subjectivity varies 
lnrroaucrwn 
according to the theorist and theoretical school to which he or she 
belongs. For example, the structuralists (e.g., Levi-Strauss) emphaSIze 
the role of institutional and formal language structures m the shapmg 
of subjectivity. The phenomenologists (e.g.,. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) 
attribute the formation of a situated subjectIVIty to hlstoncal mfluences, 
experiences, and resultant social values and norms impacting on an 
embedded subject. And the poststructuralists (e.g., Foucault, Dernda) 
assert the importance of textual, spatial, visual, and dIscursIve ordermgs. 
All of these understandings of subjectivity are based on particular 
presuppositions about the subject and subject formation. The 
structuralists see the subject as a construct created through the structures 
and application of language. Language repre.sents objects and ideas to 
us, thus portraying a specific understandmg of the world and of 
ourselves. The phenomenologists understand the subject as SOCIally and 
historically embedded; shaped by the phenomenal experiences 
encountered through life. The poststructuralists, on the other hand, 
broadly see the subject ("the self" would be a more appropnate term 
here) as decentered and multiple, implicated in and mfluenced through 
the application of knowledge, language, and images. The postmodern 
subject is represented as multiple and flUId, dlffermg m subjectiVIty 
according to the influences and expectatIOns enacted on the self. 
However, these are broad and by no means exhaustive outlines, and 
many theorists would exist in the margins and overlaps of several of 
these approaches. 
Subjectivity, in the way in which I will use the term, refers to the 
ontological and phenomenal consequences of bemg an active SOCIal 
being within a particular body, a being who interacts and IS mteracted 
with, and who is positioned temporally and spatIally. Therefore, a 
person's subjectivity is shaped by the historical, structural, and cultural! 
social settings into which s/he IS born and hves: her/hIs embodIed 
particularity; the identity that is attributed by these settmgs (mdeed, 
some would say multiple identities attributed by a multIlayered modern 
setting); and her/his intersubjective relatIOns. ThIS understandmg 
emphasizes the agency, the sociality, the historicity and the partlculanty 
of the subject. It also highlights the socially embedded/constituted nature 
of the subject and her/his resultant subJectiVIty. ThIS means that when 
considering the subjects of a community it is not pOSSIble to examme 
these subjects in isolation from the social environment m whIch they 
are positioned. 
J 
A Question of Fonn and Content 
As stated, subjectivity and intersubjective relations are shaped through 
the interplay of societal, cultural, historical, and structural pressures. It 
is, in a way, an issue of form and content. The content can be the same, 
but if the form in which that content is manifested differs, the ways in 
which the content is experienced also differ. Content, in the way in which 
I will use it here, refers to the embedded particularities of social life. 
Form refers to the ways in which these particularities are structured, 
organized, and framed.' 
Nikolas Rose (1996) writes that 
'[t]he self' is not that which is shaped by history, it is a particular historical 
plane of projection of specific projects and programmes that seek to govern 
humans through inciting them to reflect upon their conduct in a certain 
manner and act upon themselves through certain techniques. 
The human being, from this perspective, is less an entity, even an entity 
with a history, than the site of a multiplicity of practices or labours .. _. The 
human being is that kind of creature whose ontology is historical; its history 
requires an investigation of the heterogeneous and localized intellectual and 
practical techniques that have comprised the 'instruments', as it were, through 
which being constitutes itself. (300) 
I would concur that the human being, as outlined by Rose, is 
certainly influenced by the disciplines and techniques enacted on him/ 
her. However, to depict the human bein)': simply as a canvas on which 
work is undertaken is to remove all potePhql resistance, agency, and 
ontological importance from that being. Phenomenal considerations are 
of importance, but it is necessary to also acknowledge the effects that 
changes to deeper ontological categories have on subjectivity and social 
relations. 
Therefore, the interplay of both form and content should be 
considered in studies such as those undertaken in this book. Any rigid 
delineation between phenomenal and ontological considerations is 
unhelpful-phenomenal influences are incorporated within and impact 
on considerations of ontology. This is where Paul James's understanding 
and use of the concept of ontology proves helpful. In Nation Formation, 
James (1996) explains the incorporation or recognition of phenomenal 
influences on ontological understandings: 
The concept [ontology] is used in the sense of the modes of being-in-the-
world, the forms of culturally grounded conditions, historically constituted 
in the structures (recurrent practices) of human inter-relations. Thus the 
concept does not fall back upon a sense of the 'human essence' except in so 
far as the changing nature of being human is always taken to be historicallv 
constituted. The concept is not confined to the sph~re of s;lfhoo~ e.~cept 
insofar as the self is always defined in interrelation wIth the other. (xu) 
This understanding is compatible with my understanding of 
subjectivity and the recognition of its histoncally sItuated and 
intersubjective nature and is used throughout the book. 
Ontological Categories 
This brings me to an explanation as to why ontological categories are 
significant when considering issues of mtersUbjectlvlty, technology, .and 
ommunity. I employ the term ontological categorzes to explam vanous 
~ays of being. Changes in the ways these cat~gories are lived and framed 
(content and form) result in different SUbjectIve and mtersubjectlve 
relations. Technology is increasingly used to ~edlah~ relatIo:,s wlthm 
and across social relations, and this medlatlOn IS mfluentlal m the 
framing of different community forms. I am therefore mterested m 
exploring the ramifications of altering the ways m whIch some 
ontological categories are expenenced and understo~d. . . . 
The ontological categories that are partIcularly Slgmflcant for thIS 
argument are knowledge, time and space, and embodiment. These 
categories are not distinct and unrelated-all feed into and affect each 
other-yet it is strategically helpful to treat them as distinct. I will dISCUSS 
each in turn, in order to contextualize my central argument about the 
implications of technologically extended socml relatIons for forms of 
community. The first category to be discussed is knowledge or, perhaps 
more usefully, modes of social explanation. 
Modes of Social Explanation (Knowledge) . 
The phrase modes of social explanation is used to refer to thepartlcular 
knowledge or explanatory schemas that explain the world, ItS vanOUS 
parts and its interconnections (e.g., cultural understandmgs, myths, 
intellectual practices). Knowledge schemas provide frameworks for 
interpreting and operating within the world m all SOCIetIes. These 
frameworks also attribute meanings and interpretations to the other 
ontological categories mentioned. They explain how the partIculantIes 
of bodies are to be understood and related to, and how the expenences 
of time and space are to be conceptualized. For example, Abongmal 
people (prior to the European colonization of Austraha) dId not 
understand time as a linear chronological process; mstead, tIme was 
understood within their lived explanatory framework as contmuous, 
leCnnlCallY lOgether 
and geographically, physically, and socially embedded (Myers 1986: 
~. ' 
Every historical period utilizes particular knowledge and 
orgamzatlOnal schemas to explain how the world is to be viewed and 
how social life and production is to be organized and sustained. These 
schemas, whether mythological, religious, technological, Or scientific 
(or mdeed a combination of these), help to shape an understanding of 
the world and it~o associated hfe practices. Organizational practices are 
also mfluential. The description of late modern, Western capitalist 
system, for example, holds various conceptually descriptive 
representatIOns of specific societal organizations and knowledge 
frameworks. Late modern or alternatively postmodern both describe 
particular organizational methods, explanatory schemas, and practices. 
Likewise, the term Western posits a particular orientation that is 
attributed in part because of geographical location but primarily because 
of the particular knowledge and organizational frameworks that 
traditionally derive from and are enacted in these regions. It is not 
necessary to outline these descriptions in detail; that has been 
undertaken in sufficient depth by many others elsewhere. It is enough 
for our diSCUSSIOn to pomt to the eXistence and coexistence of such 
schemas. 
Foucault's writings argue that social institutions or disciplines-
which produce, as he calls them, discourses-reflect but also work to 
shape social understandings and social practices. Institutional discourses 
create categories that prescribe understandings of normal behavior 
outline that which is seen to be deviant or abnormal, and detail th~ 
procedures and practices for dealing with these various categories. In 
Dlsclpizne and PUnish, Foucault outlines the unreflexive normalization 
processes that occur through the instigation and operation of these 
discourses, and their adoption by the subject into her/his behavioral 
framework. This normalization process is maximized through the 
apphcatlOnof strategies of power (particular ways of organizing people 
and places m time and space). 
However, the above discussion is not meant to suggest that all 
knowledge schemas that have existed within particular historical 
penods are complementary or singularly focused in the same direction 
(e.g.~ promotion of individualism). The popularity or predominance of 
particular knowledge schemas can be identified at particular times. 
TIlese trends mirror to some degree, and also in some degree lead to, 
the types of SOCial relations and forms of community that are enacted. 
But such tendencies can also result in a dialectic. The dialectic created 
by the predominance of notions of individualitv and autonomv rp"dt< 
lfurUUUUWH 
in an awareness of a lack of communality. This is where current interests 
in theorizing community could be situated. 
Modes of Social Organization (Within Time and Space) 
By referring to time and space as ontological categories, I am describing 
the ways in which understanding and experiencing time and space have 
implications for our ontological understandings of ourselves and of 
others l1 All societies have their own particular time and space practices. 
In contemporary Western techno-society, social relations and 
communicative and informational practices are extended across 
increasingly larger areas of time and space. This has resulted in different 
understandings and experiences of time and space. The nation-state 
has been more easily conceptualized as a community as the development 
and utilization of transport technologies, of cartography, and of the print 
and electronic media have enabled the mental cognition of that space 
as an identifiable entity. The development of the capitalist system of 
production has necessitated the understanding of time as divisible, 
measurable, and linear.12 
Part of Foucault's strategies of power process involves the 
positioning of people within a particular time and space so as to produce 
particular behavioral practice(s). Foucault's detailed examination of 
disciplinary surveillance practices instituted within areas of social life 
is instructive. In particular, his discussion of Jeremy Bentham's 
Panopticon demonstrates how the management and ordering of time 
and space in a particular fashion can lead to the production of certain 
economies of behavior and of particular subjects. While this particular 
strand of Foucault's work has come under attack because of his 
representation of docile bodies, this does not render the concern with, 
or examination of, the ordering of time and space irrelevant. 13 What is 
useful is the realization that the ways in which time and space are 
ordered, understood, and experienced have ramifications for the 
community, the persons within that community, and also the 
intersubjective relations among such persons. 
Modes of Presence (Embodiment) 
Embodiment refers to the fact that we live in bodies and relate through 
bodies. The fact of having bodies means that each of us is imbued with 
individual particularities as a consequence of our specific bodies. These 
particularities are such things as the color of our skin, our sex, our height, 
and so forth. However, the experience of being in a body and relating 
according to that body is also affected by the types of knowledge 
frameworks that are in vlace-these describe how that body and its 
1eCrtfllLUUY lugerner 
relations are to be understood and thus experienced. And it is affected 
by how that body-in-interaction is placed within time and space. Gail 
WeIss (1999) prefers to descnbe thIs understanding as intercorporeality, 
drawmg attentIOn to the fact that we are socially embedded and that 
mtersubJectlve relations are necessarily important. She writes, 
[t]o d,escribe el~bodiment as intercorporeality is to emphasize that the 
expe:lence of bemg e~bodi~d is never a private affair, but is always already 
medIated by our contmual mteractions with other human and nonhuman 
bodies. (Weiss, 1999: 5) 
. Some feminists and postmodernists argue that embodied identity 
IS ascnbed a partIcular place by the society's norms and values and that 
as such, ascriptions of gender, for example, are social constructs. These 
SOCIal ascriptions too have intermittently undergone change over time 
and across dIfferent societies. However, as noted above, there is also an 
added empha~is that embodiment carries with it specific experiences 
that are bIOlogIcally determined and thus have particular influences on 
the subject (content). As Anne Balsamo (1996) explains in Technologies of 
the Gendered Body, there must be consideration for both the social 
constructIOn of the body- that is, the way the society understands and 
constructs thebody-and the physical experience of the body with all 
of Its POSSlbIhtIes and hmltatIons (23-24). Living within a body therefore 
carnes WIth It ItS own particular biological constraints and 
consIderatIOns, as well as being imprinted with the socially constructed 
deSIgnatIOn of where and how a particular body is situated within a 
culture: Accordmg to such designations, your body colors your 
perceptIons of the rest of the world. You are born, you will age, and you 
WIll also die. Your body also has to be fed, washed, rested, and so forth. 
Yet how these processes are undertaken and understood also is mediated 
through social discourses and norms. 
These ontological categories are discussed in more detail throughout 
the book. They provide ameans, Or conceptual language, through which 
to explore and to explam some of the implications of the increasing 
technologIcal medIatIOn of SOCIal practIces. Technically mediated 
relatIons have consequences for our understandings and experiences 
of community and for our relations with the Other. These 
understandings need to be framed in an ethically appropriate manner. 
Ethical Concerns 
Any discussion of community and community relations inescapably 
This brings to the forefront concerns over the ethical appropriateness 
of any theoretical construction. Concern for the Other must either be 
able to be accommodated or alternatively be justified in the current 
theoretical climate. When discussing community - particularly in light 
of its sometimes problematic historical manifestations14-such ethical 
issues are a central concern. 
To achieve a politically and ethically appropriate theory, Stephen 
White (1991: 20) discusses two ethics that he believes need to be 
incorporated and given equal emphasis: a responsibility to act and a 
responsibility to Otherness. Any community theory needs to incorpora te 
elements of both these responsibilities to be politically effective and 
ethically appropriate. 
The theorists who are to be considered in the following pages vary 
in the emphasis they place on such considerations, which has 
implications for the political efficacy and ethical appropriateness of their 
theories. What is common to all these theorists is a concern about the 
isolation or individuation that predominates in contemporary Western 
society and the perceived need for a strengthening or recognition of 
connection with others. All grapple to varying degrees with the 
integrative/differentiating dilemma. However, their adherence to or 
concern with matters of practice are more problematic. The intersection 
of the phenomenal and the ontological is graphically demonstrated with 
the introduction of technological processes to mediate community 
forms. 
Structure of the Book 
The book is divided into two parts, consisting of three chapters each. 
The first part starts the process of constructing a theoretical framework 
for discussing community, technology, and social relations. Chapter One 
examines some general understandings of community. It notes the 
struggle that community theorists face when attempting to 
conceptualize a notion of community that is accommodating of 
individual difference while creating/recognizing integrative communal 
forms. The chapter also posits that any consideration of community 
necessitates an examination of community's subjective and structural 
elements. It derives three analytical categories by which to delineate 
structural forms: traditional, modern, and postmodern, according to 
the ways in which community mediates its social relations across time 
and space. Technology is introduced as being centrally involved in both 
the possibilities for and the predominance of extended community forms 
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considers the ways in which the subjective categories of community-
bonding, commonality, reciprocity and recognition, and identity-are 
negotiated. 
Chapter Two explores the possibilities and processes enacted by 
the use of mformatlon and communications technologies in more detail. 
It examines issues of interactivity within the various types and uses of 
communication technologies. Interactivity is central when considering 
the types of intersubjective relations that are practiced through the use 
of technology, and for the subjective outcomes of such practices. Through 
the discussion, it becomes clear that the claims made by many 
proponents of such technologies as the Internet as to their liberatory 
and communitarian potential are less than straightforward. The chapter 
considers briefly the implications for social forms as a result of the 
utilization and appropriation of technology to mediate and extend 
sociality and integrative practices. It takes virtual communities as one 
example of extended social forms and explores in more detail some of 
the implications of extended or disembodied sociality. It then extends 
the phenomenal considerations discussed so far a little further to 
consider the types of processes- abstraction, extension and 
compression, and instrumental rationalization -enacted through the 
employment of these technologies and some of the ontological 
considerations that result. 
Chapter Three advances the argument that the intersubjective 
relations between, and the subjectivities of, community members are 
important in understanding community forms. It argues that as these 
relations are realized within/across the specific ontological categories 
of embodiment, knowledge, and time and space, their structuring has 
ramifications for the types of intersubjective relations that are practiced 
and experienced. Several types of intersubjective relations are identified 
and are used to describe the types of relation held/practiced with the 
Other. Technology is introduced as a way in which the extension of 
community forms and the mediation of social forms have been enabled 
resulting in various intersubjective outcomes and possibilities. ' 
Part Two of the book carries forward some of the concepts and 
analytic distinctions discussed in the previous section and uses these 
as a way to examine the works of three contemporary community 
theorists. 
Therefore, Chapter Four undertakes a critical analysis of the work 
of Charles Taylor. Taylor is commonly grouped with other writers such 
as Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, and Alisdair MacIntyre (although 
this list is far from exhaustive) into the loose description of 
communitarian. Taylor's negotiation of the integrative/differentiating 
dilemma IS explored through his notion of authenticitv (differpntiMino-\ 
and of communicative relations (integrating). His understanding of 
intersubjectivity is examined, as are his discussions of the implications 
of technology. Consideration of his approach to the subjective 
considerations discussed in Chapter One is undertaken, as IS hiS 
approach, if any, to structural questions. . 
Chapter Five discusses the work of French theonst Jean-Luc Nancy. 
In particular, it examines Nancy'S most commonly cited work .on 
community, The inoperative Community, which explores an understandmg 
of community that takes place in the space between singular beings-or 
more correctly, at the site or limit where singular beings meet. Nancy 
negotiates the integrative/differentiating dilemma through an approach 
that highlights the incomplete sharing of this between, and of the 
importance of literature (integrative), and t~e eXistence and actiVities 
of singular beings (differentiating).15 Nancy s notIOn of subjectiVity IS 
also explored, and an attempt is made to draw out the Implications of 
his (limited) statements about technology. From here hiS theoretical 
formulations are extended to see if they can accommodate my concerns 
vis-a.-vis technology and community. 
Chapter Six turns to a theorist who is interested in the possibilities 
for community enabled by technological potentialities. Mark Poster 
negotiates the integrative/differentiating dilemma th.rough hiS 
understanding of fhe communicative and interactive pOSSibilities of new 
technologies (integrative) and what he sees to be the new and multiple 
identity possibilities enabled by such interaction (differentiating). HIS 
notion of subjectivity is explored, as are his suppositions about the 
subjective implication of the use of communicative technologies. 
Chapter Seven draws together the various threads of the book and 
explains if and how these community theorists can contribute to a further 
understanding of the interplay of community and technology. However, 
this chapter is also interested in highlighting some ethical concerns that 
become apparent as the book progresses. Relations with the Other are 
often seen as one of the most problematic outcomes of commumty 
formulation and of community practice. Contemporary community 
theoretical reformulations attempt to address this problematic through 
abstract processes-either theoretically or technologically. Finally, the 
conclusion raises some concerns as to the consequences of such abstract 
processes. . 
Our use of technology impacts on our expenences and 
understandings of time, space, and the body. It heightens our ability to 
connect with others in a manner increasingly unconstrained by temporal 
or spatial constraints. Yet it also accentuates the individual, who is lifted 
out of the social environment within which s/he is immersed. The 
;nrrp~~ino- nnminance of technologicallv extended social relations has 
implications for our understandings and experiences of community and 
community relations. The following pages begin an exploration of the 
nature and consequences of such implications and review the ability of 
some contemporary writers on community to adequately explain or 
accommodate these socio-technological relations. To begin such an 
undertaking, a conceptual framework needs to be constructed. It is to 
this task that the book now turns. 
Notes 
I The idea of community is experiencing a resurgence in interest among both 
theorists and the society at large. America has seen the growth of a Communitarian 
Network, which claims the community has suffered through the privileging of 
individual rights and concerns. There has been an increase in the rhetoric of community 
employed by politicians such as Bill Clinton and Tony Blair (see Willson, 1995). The 
Third Way is premised on the importance of community (Scanlon, 2000). And numerous 
texts point to the demise of community and a rise in individualist behavior (for example, 
Putnam's Bowling Alone or Bauman's Community: Seeking Safety hI an Insecure World). 
2 Or at the very least, there are so many different understandings that the 
usefulness of the concept itself has been questioned. For example, see Bell and Newby 
(1979) for an overview of the many different SOciological definitions of community. 
3 This is not to take a technological determinist approach, inasmuch as I am not 
saying that technology alone produces specific, unavoidable practices or outlooks. 
Rather, I am arguing that the uses to which the technology is applied by the society! 
culture; the modes of thought that are accentuated by technological applications; and 
the practices that are enabled or increased through the technological capabilities 
available all have ramifications for the experience of subjectivity. 
4 This has been a recurrent theme through much of the work undertaken by 
feminist theorists. For example, see the works of Carol Gilligan or Iris Marion Young. 
This is also, though in a different form, seen in the work of Amitai Etzioni, who argues 
that the health of the community has suffered through the privileging of the individual 
in political and social life. 
:; Since its publication, there have been a number of updates to this book. Such 
updates reflect the changing practices and demographics of virtual communities, as 
well as RheingoJd's awareness of and engagement with more recent critical literature 
on the topic. 
6 While virtual communities~in the sense of communities without propinquity-
existed prior to the Internet and networked computers, the increasingly popular 
adoption of both the term and the practice of online gathering make them an important 
social form to be considered. The acronyms MUDs and MOOS have been adopted 
into virtual speak to refer to various virtual community forms, such as Multi-User 
Domains, etc. 
7 He is certainly not alone in this vision. The notion of electronic town hall 
democracy is a common prediction (particularly among early writers) arising as a 
consequence of the technological possibilities of the Internet. See Rob Kitchin (1998) 
for some examples. While these claims have by no means disappeared, they are 
accompanied by more recent critical and less utopian assessments of the Internet's 
democratic potential. 
1> Such arguments are extensive throughout writings about the Internet ~~d 
c bers ace. For just a few examples, see the works of Howard Rheingo~~, Sherry Tur e, Ir the ~dited collections by Steven Jones. However, increasingly cntlcal analyses. of 
virtual communities and online subjectivity are also being published that questI~n 
h d f
· I "t and/or the openness of such interactive forms (see, forexamp e, t e egree 0 mc USIVI y ) 
some of the work undertaken by Kolka, Nakamura, and Rodman on race. . 
9 I recognize that these are by nO means straightforward or uncompl~cated 
distinctions and that it could be legitimately argued that content and form are sImply 
positioned ~ithin a continuum of social forms. Nevertheless, 1 continue to employ 
them as useful analytical divisions. . ' . 
10 This is an example of how the different ontologicaJ.cat~gofles ar~ not dlstmct 
and se arate Organizational practices involve the combmahon of bemg .based .on 
partic!tar kn~wledge frameworks. and t~ey also result in bodies and practIces bcmg 
ositioned within time and space In partIcular ways. . . ' 
P 11 See David Harvey (1990) for a detailed exploratIon of the changI~? w~ys In 
which time and space (for example, through the introduction and ut~hzatlOn of 
carta ra h ) have been explored throughout modernity and postmodermty. 
,'if sp karvey (1990) and Anderson (1991) or the edited collection by Friedland 
ee . h' h h the ways of d Boden (1994b) for their discussions on the ways m w IC c anges In 
::periencing, organiZing, and r:presenting time and space have altered conceptual 
understandings of such categones. . . . . . 
13 This is also despite Foucault's own modification of hIS pOSitIOn WIth relatIOn to 
the subject and disciplinary practices in his later works. . 
14 Nazi Germany is one example held up to demonstrate the dangers?f commU:lt~~ 
15 While this statement is a somewhat inaccurate and clumsy reductIOn of Nan y 
sophisticated analysis, the sentiment is largely accurate. 
